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ABSTRACT
Malicious insiders account for large proportion of security breaches or other kinds of loss for
organizations and have drawn attention of both academics and practitioners. Although methods and
mechanism have been developed to monitor potential insider via electronic data monitoring, few studies
focus on predicting potential malicious insiders. Based on the theory of planned behavior, certain cues
should be observed or expressed when an individual performs as a malicious insider. Using text mining to
analyze various media content of existing insider cases, we strive to develop a method to identify crucial
and common indicators that an individual might be a malicious insider.
Keywords: malicious insider, insider threat, the theory of planned behavior, text mining
1. INTRODUCTION
In the field of information security, the subject
of “insider threat” garners a lot of attention, yet
has been deprived of sound empirical
investigation. However, there is considerable
anecdotal mention of the insider threat issue. In
a recent report, the FBI noted 10 examples of
insider attacks reported in recent years including
the theft of trade secrets, corporate espionage,
and the unauthorized disclosure of information
(FBI report, 2010). These insider incidents
resulted in financial losses in the millions of
dollars.
Some researchers believe that insider threat, as
opposed to outsider attacks, is easier to achieve
as insiders are more familiar with the security
structure of the in organizations in which they
work (Anderson, 1999; Chinchani, Iyer, Ngo, &
Upadhyaya, 2005). Insiders of an organizations
either have legitimate access to organizational
resources (Bishop, Engle, Peisert, Whalen, &
© 2015 ADFSL

Gates, 2009) or have knowledge about the
operations of the organization (Probst, Hunker,
Gollmann, & Bishop, 2010). With their
knowledge and legitimate access, they can
bypass security protocols and exploit the trust
the organization has placed on them (Bellovin,
2008).

Information Age
The information age has brought on new
outcomes from insider threat. Consequences of
insider attacks have multi-dimensional loss,
including financial loss, disruption to the
organization, loss of reputation, and long-term
impacts on organizational culture (Hunker &
Probst, 2011). When compared to consequences
of outsider attack, insider attack yields incidents
with higher impacts (Chinchani et al., 2005)
since insiders are familiar with countermeasures
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of organizations and know how to find their
targets.

The topics of insider and insider threat have
received significant attention from both
practitioners and academia in the information
age. On one hand, insider threat is considered as
one of the most serious security concerns
(Anderson, 1999) as noted in the results of the
2008 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey
that listed “insider threat” second only to
computer viruses a significant security concern.
However, insider threat has received a relatively
low level of scientific investigation (Chinchani
et al., 2005). One important reason for this lack
of attention is due to the difficulties in dealing
with insider threat. Some of the reasons
contributing to this gap in the research include
lack of data for analysis and few useful methods
for investigating the topic. As such,
organizations employ technical controls such as
firewalls and limit user access or order to
prevent possible insider breaches of security.
Unfortunately, technical controls do little to
isolate suspicious and malicious insider
activities without unacceptable false positive
alarms. For example, access control based on
authentication and authorization has an
important assumption that insiders would always
use legitimate privileges to perform harmful
activities and thus be caught, but once this
assumption is violated, access control will lose
its power.
Monitoring, another prevailing technique
dealing with insider threat, is based on
assumption that abnormal system usage
indicates suspicious insiders. But monitoring is
more of a post-hoc confirmation method to
confirm already suspicious insiders of interest
(Hunker & Probst, 2011), and thus brings into
question if it can serve as a deterrent. (Pfleeger,
2008)
Technical approaches to insider threat combat
suffer for two major shortcomings: First,
malicious insider intention can be unobservable
(Hunker & Probst, 2011) and behavioral patterns
of insiders vary significantly. However, all
insider attacks have one thing in common: they
are performed by insiders with motivation. In a
2005 study about insider incidents in the
© 2015 ADFSL
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banking and financing sector Randazzo, et al.
(2005) found that in 23 insider incidents from
1996 to 2003, 81% incidents involved
perpetrators were motivated by financial gains,
other than that, 23% for revenge, 15% for
dissatisfaction and 15% for desire for respect.
Other research suggests that anger, resentment
or feelings of revenge could be root causes of
insider attacks (De Cremer, 2006).

The extant research also tries to identify
psychological indicators of malicious insiders’
motivation. Greitzer and Frincke (2010)
developed 12 indicators of suspicious malicious
insiders, top three of which are disgruntlement,
accepting feedback and anger management
issues. They also relayed that these indicators
are fairly good predictors. However, these
indicators are all factors which might be
observed at workplace and assumption behind
this is that a potential or ongoing malicious
insider would reveal this at work. This may not
always be the cases as disciplined insiders may
stay “under the radar” and not exhibit such
indicators. Further, these indicators have yet to
be empirically validated.
The current state of the insider threat
phenomenon is more oriented toward preventing
possible perpetrators and less concerned with the
identification and capture. This study aims to
advance the existing research on identifying
malicious insiders by employing information
technology to validate insider threat indicators
with empirical evidence.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows: in
the next section, we will review extant research
on insider threat and introduce a research model
to guide our investigation of potential indicators.
Following that, we will discuss our data
collection plan and methodology for analyzing
that data.
Finally, we will conclude by
discussing some challenges and limitations in
our forthcoming study.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, we will first review definitions of
both insider and insider threat and then the
theory of planned behavior is discussed as
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theoretical basis for the current research. Last
but not the least, indicators of malicious in
extant research are reviewed and organized into
our framework.
2.1 Terminology
Insiders
One of the challenges insider threat research is
the lack of a widely accepted definition of
insider. The term, insider, can be defined in
several dimensions (Hunker & Probst, 2011):
Access to the system: an insider is defined as
legitimate user (Chinchani et al., 2005) who is or
previously has been authorized the access to an
information system. Other definitions, instead,
extend the meaning of access to include physical
access and, an insider is defined as having
logical or physical access (Randazzo, Keeney,
Kowalski, Cappelli, & Moore, 2005).
Action based definition: “access to the system”
definition defines who insiders are but action
based definition defines what insiders do.
Bishop and Gates (2008) defines an insider
someone as who “violate security policy”.
Intention based definition: Hayden (1999)
defines four categories of insider: traitor, zealot,
browser and well-intentioned insider. Zealot
strongly believes correctness should be made
insider the organization; browser is a category of
individuals who are overly curious in nature;
traitor category includes those who have a
malicious intent to “destroy, damage, or sell out
their organizations”.
Moreover in more general sense, some research
removes information system context (Bishop,
Gollmann, Hunker, & Probst, 2008) and some
combined several dimensions together, such as
Wood’s definition which classified insider into
different categories based on their system roles,
intention and system consequences (Wood,
2000).
As stated by Hunker and Probst (2011), the
definition of insider highly depends on research
questions and situations of interest. In this
research we focus on all kinds of insiders not
confined to the information technology context
and all malicious actions performed by these
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insiders. For this research, we use the definition
by Bishop and Gollmann (2008):
An insider is a person that has been
legitimately empowered with the right to
access, represent, or decide about one
or more assets of the organization’s
structure.
However as noted above, there exists various
kinds of insiders and the subject of this research
are malicious insiders, whose profiles are
consistent with the description of Hunker and
Probst: an individual deeply embedded in an
organization, highly trusted and in a position to
do great damage if so inclined.

Insider Threat
The definition of insider threat depends on how
insider is defined. Intuitively, insider threat is a
threat posed by insiders. However, this
definition is problematic since we could not
have clear understanding of “threat” or evaluate
“risk” of this threat even if “insider” were well
defined. As argued by Hunker and Probst (2011),
each factor used to determine insider can be
used to determine taxonomy.
Although the majority of extant research defines
insider threat as certain type of actions, no
widely accepted taxonomy of insider threat
exists. Hunker and Probst (2011) defines insider
threats as potential misuses and actions which
result in misuse. Chinchani and colleagues
(2005) define insider threat as abuse of
privileges with consequence of damage or losses.
In other places in Chinchani’s research, insider
threat is also defined as “violation of policies”.
Specifically, Randazzo defines insider threat as
actions affected the security of the organization’
data, system or operation (Randazzo et al., 2005).
Other research classified insider threats into
different categories by different factors from
different perspectives. Based on intentions,
insider threat is classified into malicious or
inadvertent actions (Brackney & Anderson,
2004). Combined with technical expertise
dimension, actions are categorized into
international destruction, detrimental misuse,
dangerous tinkering, naïve mistakes, aware
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assurance and basic hygiene (Stanton, Stam,
Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005).

In this research, we adopt a broad definition of
Predd et al. (2008) as:

As noted in extant research, there exists various
insiders and characteristics of insiders are
inherently different in multi-dimensions.
Consequently, definitions of insider threat
depended heavily on the context of the study as
well as research questions. Some research
embraces this idea and suggests defining insider
threat in a loose and general way to avoid “fine
nuances” (Flegel, Vayssiere, and Bitz, 2010)
while other research defines insider threat as a
contextual taxonomy based on characteristics of
the individual, the organization, the system and
the environment (Predd, Pfleeger, Hunker, &
Bulford, 2008).

Insider threat: an insider’s action that
puts an organization or its resources at
risk.
Predd et al.(2008), also extends this definition
by specifying a contextual way as shown below
(Figure 1). This diagram states that instead of
defining insider threat as a term including
various types of activities in a universal way, it’s
better to include its context, including
organization,
system,
environment
and
individuals as part of its definition. However,
they do not differentiate non-malicious or
careless insiders from malicious insiders

Figure 1 A Framework Of Insider Threat

This definition is adopted by two reasons:

First, Predd’s definition is consistent with our
adopted taxonomy of insider. Research (Predd et
al., 2008), from which we adopt definition of
insider, defines insider threat as:
“an insider threat is an individual with
privileges who misuses them or whose
access results is misuse.”

offering a top-down method in order to map
different scenarios.

Second, Predd’s definition is consistent with our
research question. The intended contribution of
this study is to empirically identify common
characteristics of malicious insiders. Our study
focuses on identifying indicators that might help
identify malicious insiders before they exploit
their privileged access.

This definition is consistent with respect to
system usage as well as organizational
consequence. What’s more, it broadens
Hunker’s definition by adding context and
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2.3 Factors Affecting Incidents of Insider
Threat

2.2 Criminology Theory and The Theory of
Planned Behavior
As stated by previous research, certain theories
in criminology are relevant to insider threat
detection and prevention (Hunker & Probst,
2011) such as earlier theories of deterrence
(Kankanhalli, et. al., 2003; Straub & Welke,
1998), social bonds (Lee et.al., 2004), and social
learning (Hollinger, 1993; Parker & Parker,
1976; Skinner & Fream, 1997) which are
integrated into the theory of planned behavior
(Dugo, 2007; J. Lee & Lee, 2002; Peace, et.al.,
2003).
Additionally, the Theory of Planned Behavior
(TPB) was developed to explain and predict
specific behaviors in a specific context (Ajzen,
1991). According to the theory, human behavior
is guided by three kinds of considerations:
behavioral beliefs, normative beliefs, and control
beliefs (Ajzen, 1985). Behavioral beliefs are an
individual’s expectation of outcomes and their
evaluations of these outcomes; normative beliefs
represent other’s expectation and individual’s
willingness to comply with these expectations
and the last one refers to external factors which
facilitate individual’s intended action. From the
framework of planned behavior, an individual’s
behavior is the result of motivation (behavioral
beliefs), environments (normative beliefs) and
opportunities (control beliefs).
The relevance of TPB is confirmed by both
survey, in which among 23 insider incidents,
81% of related insiders planned their job;
(Randazzo et al., 2005), as well as by theoretical
model which includes risk-averse nature and
planned action as factors affecting an insider’s
action (Wood, 2000). Further, Predd et al.
(2008) argue that insider threat should be
defined as specific to its context which makes it
suitable for applying criminology into the study
of insider threat.

© 2015 ADFSL

Based on Predd’s (2008) work, an insider’s
actions are shaped by four factors: organization,
individual himself/herself, environment and
system. Organization sets up security rules and
policy, as well as affect insider’s action via
organization
culture.
System
reflects
implemented policy; environments shape and
constrain both organizational behavior and an
insider’s behavior through social or ethical
norms; last but not the least, the individual’s
motivation directly affects how he/she plans and
mount insider attacks. In this section, we will
start with this framework and review related
researches
about
organizational
factors
(including system), the insider’s motivation and
environmental effects.

2.3.1 Organizational Factors
According to Predd, organizational factors
affecting insider threat include organizational
security policy and organizational culture.
Organizational security policy includes not only
articulated policy but also implemented policy
(the system). Besides, organizational culture
affects insider threat via leveraging its
employee’s awareness and compliance of
security policy as well as its management styles.
(1) Policy
Three aspects of policy will influence the effect
of policy: capability of policy language, stated
policy and implemented policy. First, as stated
by Hunker and Probst, (2011), capability of
policy language is not adequate to effectively
prevent insider threat and this is the inherent
shortcomings of policy language. This
disadvantage originates from complex and
dynamic situation which policy are facing. And
he also suggests that deployment of domainspecified policy which could clarify situations in
which execution could only be authorized when
discretionary circumstances justify them. Second,
policy taking place is not inherently the same
kind as argued by Hunker, four hierarchy exist
as oracle policy, feasible policy, configured
policy and real time policy. Unawareness and
Page 165
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misunderstanding of policy hierarchy could
result in policy absence or policy conflict.

What’s more, policies are not always explicit but
sometimes implicit and gap exists between
stated policy and observed policy (Puhakainen,
2010), which could be mitigated by security
training programs (Vance, 2012) and increased
participation of top managers (Hu, 2012).
(2) Organization Culture
Specifically,
organization
culture
affect
incidents of insider threat in the following
aspects:
First, whether security policy support or
interfere with organizational work flow will
affect compliance with security policy.
Second, levels of security awareness to
organization members will affect insider strategy
(Hunker & Probst, 2011). Levels of security
awareness includes perception, understanding
and prediction (Shaw, Post, & Ruby, 1999).
Third, organizational purpose and management
structure will affect security structure and policy.

2.3.2 Motivation of Insiders
We note that extant research focusing on
motivations of insider and insider threats does
not differentiate terms of “psychological profile”
and “motivation”. The former focuses more on
personal or internal motivations and the latter
focuses more on goals of insiders’ actions.
In another study, (Wood, 2000) lists four major
goals of malicious insiders: profit; provoking
change such as change in policy; subverting
mission of organization; and personal goals such
as being respected or gaining power.
On the other hand, when considering
psychological profile, Stolfo and colleagues
(2008) list 10 types of motivation which might
be most harmful:
(1) making unintentional mistake;
(2) trying to accomplish needed tasks;
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(3) trying to make the system do something
for which it was not designed as a form
of innovation to make the system more
useful or usable;
(4) trying innocently to do something
beyond the authorized limit, without
knowing the action is unauthorized;
(5) checking the system for weakness,
vulnerabilities or errors, with the
intention of reporting problems
(6) testing the limits of authorization;
checking the system for weaknesses,
vulnerabilities or errors, without the
intention of reporting problems;
(7) browsing, killing time by viewing data;
(8) expressing boredom, revenge or
disgruntlement;
(9) perceiving a challenge: treating the
system as a game to outwit;
(10)
acting with the intention of
causing harm, for reasons such as fame,
greed, capability, divided loyalty or
delusion.

Additionally,
Greitzer and Frinke (2010)
identified several psychological indicators such
as disgruntled, anger management issues and
ignorance of authority, and in a case study
about sabotage and espionage, common
characteristics such as antisocial and narcissistic
personalities have been identified (Moore, et. al,
2008).
These indicators mentioned above are just a
small piece of the big picture. Harmful actions
performed by insiders include espionage,
sabotage (Gelles, 2005; Krofcheck & Gelles,
2005) or just accidental mistakes (Predd et al.,
2008) or innocent errors (Salem, Hershkop, &
Stolfo, 2008). Motivations of these actions are
just as diverse as types of actions (Salem et al.,
2008).

2.3.3 Environmental Factors
Predd argues that environment defines whether
an action is legal or ethical and emphasizes
punishment enforced by law (Nance & Marty,
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2011). What’s more, cultural differences and
attitude toward what is appropriate will also
affect bounds of insiders as well as definitions of
malicious.
For example, Edward Snowden
appears to believe he was “doing the right thing”
when he exposed NSA information.
As mentioned before, complex and dynamic of
external environment will affect policy making
as well as policy implementation (Hunker &
Probst, 2011), as a result, affect incidents of
insider attacks.
2.3.4 System

System is implemented policy (Predd et al.,
2008) and techniques support, technically, the
realization of security policy. Current techniques
to mitigate insider threat include access control,
monitoring, integrated approaches, trusted
system and predicting model.
2.3.4.1 Access Control
Access control has two aspects: authentication
and authorization. Authentication defines who
you are and authorization defines what you can
do. However, access control has limitations such
as it could not prevent users who are using
legitimate privileges to behave as malicious
insiders.
2.3.4.2 Monitoring
This paper talks about two types of monitoring
and several techniques to perform monitoring.
These two types are misuse detection and
anomaly detection.
Misuse detection and modeling identifies
defined types of misuse through rule-based
detection. But limitation is this method could
only detect known type of insider attack.
Framework to perform this includes finite state
machine, petri nets or regular expression.
Anomaly Detection flags significant deviation
from expected normal behavior as a proxy for
unknown misuse. Method and theories used here
include co-currence of multiple events, highorder of markov chain, naïve Bayesian network.
Problems with monitoring includes no evidence
as deterrent and violation of privacy.

© 2015 ADFSL

2015 CDFSL Proceedings

2.3.4.3 Integrated Approaches

Integrated approaches take combined several
techniques together, including honey pots,
network level sensor, physical logs, and model
of insiders and pre-attack insiders to infer
malicious intent.
2.3.4.4 Trusted System
Key characteristic of trusted system is reference
validation (Neumann, 2010): each execution
could be tracked back to specific users. This
characteristic makes trusted system as resistant
to insiders as well as to outsiders. In operations,
a trusted system is implemented by isolating
executing privilege domains with less privilege
domains, isolating one user’s access from
another user’s access (Saltzer, 1974) or
assigning user specific random domains
(Neumann, 2010).
2.3.4.5 Predicting Model
Predicting model uses system usage as
predictors of insider attacks, such as inconsistent
digital behaviors (Dimkov, 2011) and unusual
access (Probst, 2009).

3. INTRODUCTION
MODEL

OF

RESEARCH

In this section, we will first build our model
based on the planned behavior theory and other
related theories and research. Then constructs
and their corresponding measures will be
discussed.
3.1 Model Derivation
There has been a considerable amount of work
with respect to individual motivations in the
literature. Researchers from various disciplines
propose that the constructs depicted in the table
are indicators of insider threat. As noted, our
motivation is to validate those constructs.
Figure 2 shows our model derived from the
Theory of Planned Behavior, in which insider
threat incident behavior is preceded by three
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constructs:

attitude,

subjective

norm

and

perceived
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behavioral

control.

Figure 2: Research Model

3.1.1 Attitude

© 2015 ADFSL

Attitude refers to “the degree to which a person
has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or
Page 168
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appraisal of the behavior in question” (Ajzen,
1991).

Internal as well as insider’s perception about
external factors would affect the insider’s
attitude towards what he or she is doing or plan
to do. From previous literature, factors affecting
an insider’s attitude towards himself or herself
include both internal and external factors:
3.1.1.1 Internal Factors
(1) Self-image
Randall,1989)

(Loch

&

Conger,

1996;

(2) Deindividuation (Lee & Lee, 2002; Loch &
Conger, 1996)
(3) Commitment to organization (Dugo, 2007;
Lee & Lee, 2002; Li,et al., 2010)
(4)Beliefs (Loch &Conger,1996; Vance,
et,al., ,2012;)
(5) Psychological Indicators (Greitzer & Frincke,
2010; Moore et al., 2008)
3.1.1.2 External Factors or
Perception about External Factors

Insider’s

(1) Perceived punishment severity and
perceived punishment certainty (Cox, 2012;
Dugo, 2007; Ifinedo, 2012; Li, et.al., 2010;
Peace et al., 2003; Peach, et al., 2010; Son,
2011; Vance,et,al., 2012)
(2) Security culture (Hu et. al., 2012)
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Perceived behavioral control refers to people’s
perception of the ease or difficulty of performing
the behavior of interest (Ajzen, 1991).

Although in the theory of planned behavior,
perceived behavioral control is one predictor of
intention of behavior, actual level of behavioral
control was also used as a predictor (Bulgurcu,
Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010). In Bulgurcu’s
research, number of security staffs and number
of security systems in use are used as predictor
of IT security policy compliance behavior.
Predicting power of actual behavioral control is
also confirmed by Ajzen (1991), one of the
builder of the theory of planned behavior,
arguing perceived behavioral control serves as a
proxy for actual behavioral control.
Factors affecting perceived behavioral control in
existing research include:
(1) punishment certainty (Peace et al., 2003)
(2) security policy and security systems(Lee
& Lee, 2002)
(3) locus of control (Cox, 2012)
3.2 Definition of Constructs
There has been a considerable amount of work
with respect to individual motivations in the
literature. Researchers from various disciplines
propose that the constructs depicted below. As
noted, our motivation is to validate those
constructs.

(3) Organizational culture (Cox, 2012; Hu et al.,
2012)
3.1.2 Subjective Norm
Subjective norm is a social factor and refers to
“perceived social pressure to perform or not to
perform or not to perform the behavior”(Ajzen,
1991). Therefore, in the context of insider threat
research, subjective norm is specified as how coworkers and senior works feel about insiders’
actions (Lee & Lee, 2002).
But in this research, we extend Lee’s scope of
subjective norm to include influences from
family or any other sources, not limited to
influences exerted from workplaces.
3.1.3 Perceived Behavioral Control

3.2.1

Self-image

In
previous
research,
demographic
characteristics of insiders include gender, age,
education, socioeconomic status, religion,
marriage status, professions and position in
organization (Randall, 1989). And self-image is
the characteristic an individual defines himself
or herself (Loch & Conger, 1996). As argued by
Loch & Conger, if an individual defines himself
or herself by religion, he or she is mostly likely
to comply with rules of that religion. Therefore,
characteristic used by individual to define
himself or herself serves as one measure of his
or her attitude.
3.2.2 Deindividuation

© 2015 ADFSL
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Deindividuation is first defined as a feeling of
“being estranged or separated from others that
can lead to behavior violating established norms
of appropriateness” (Zimbardo, 1969). What’s
more, it is widely used in insider threat
researches as an antecedent of insider threat (Lee
& Lee, 2002; Loch & Conger, 1996). People
with deindividuation has less interaction with
others and will be less likely to perform socially
accepted behaviors.
3.2.2

Perceived
Severity/Certainty

Punishment

If an individual’s perceived punishment severity
is high and perceived probability to be
discovered is high, he or she would perceived a
high level of behavioral control.
3.2.3 Commitment to Organization/Beliefs
Commitment to organization refers to “one is
committed to conformity by not only what one
has but also what one hopes to attain” (Hirschi,
2002). And beliefs refer to strength of
individual’s feeling about whether he or she
should comply with organizational rules.
Therefore, the more an individual is committed
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to organization, the less likely he or she is to
commit malicious threat to organization (Dugo,
2007; Lee & Lee, 2002).

3.2.4 Organizational Culture
Organizational culture refers to whether the
organization is goal-oriented or rule-oriented.
For a goal-oriented organization, insiders
comply with organization by fulfilling
organizational goals, however, rule-oriented
organization requires insiders comply with
procedures and regulations (Cox, 2012; Hu et al.,
2012).
3.2.5 Security Policy and Systems
Security policy and security systems refer to
official and implemented security policies in
organization. Quality of security-whether stated
policy covers potential risk emerging area-as
well as implemented policy-how many security
systems are used- will affect organizational
security level (Hu et. al. 2012).
3.2.6 Psychological Indicators
Twelve psychological indicators are suggested
by Greitzer & Frincke (2010) as shown in Table
1:

Table 1 Psychological Indicators
Indicator
Disgruntlement
Accepting Feedback
Anger
Management
Issues
Disengagement
Disregard for authority
Performance
Stress
Confrontational
Behavior
Personal Issues
Self-Centeredness
Lack of Dependability
Absenteeism
© 2015 ADFSL

Description
Employee observed to be dissatisfied in current position.
The employee is observed to have a difficult time accepting criticism.
The employee often allows anger to get pent up inside.
The employee keeps to self, is detached, withdrawn and tends not to interact
with individuals or groups; avoid meetings.
The employee disregards rules, authority or policies.
The employee has received a corrective action based on poor performance.
The employee appears to be under physical, mental or emotional strain or
tension that he or she has difficulty handling.
Employee exhibits argumentative or aggressive behavior or is involved in
bullying or intimidation.
Employee has difficulty keeping personal issues separate from work.
The employee disregards needs or wishes of others, concerned primarily
with own interests and welfare.
Employee is unable to keep commitments or promises; unworthy of trust.
Employee has exhibited chronic unexplained absenteeism.
Page 170
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4. Methodology
As noted above, previous research often focuses
on preventing insider incidents as opposed to
actually identifying malicious insiders. Further,
while some malicious insider characteristics
have been proposed, many have not had to stand
the scrutiny of empirical investigation. We aim
to close these gaps by using text mining and
classification to exam third party data; namely
past reports on captured malicious insiders and
empirically examine their characteristics. Then
we intend to use those empirically supported
characteristics in an attempt to better predict and
identify potential malicious insiders.
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records, VPN login records and so on. When
these data are collected, algorithms will be
employed to calculate observations. Fuller, et.
al. (2009) demonstrated how decision tress,
neural networks, and logistic regression can be
used in similar law enforcement cases.

Once the data is mined and classified,
observations can be made. Observations are
inferences from data to reflect a certain state. In
previous example, timecard records (data) and
VPN login could be used to calculate Time At
Work (observation).
From observations,
indicators can be derived. Indicators are referred
to actions or events that are precursors of a
certain behavior. In previous examples, unusual
late work hour (indicator) could be derived from
time at work (observation).
4.2.2 Extension of Previous Method

4.1 Data Sample
Data used in this study are mainly from two
sources: public reports and previous research.
We will begin by text mining public reports for
keywords of name (the insider) involved in
discovered insider incidents. Once we identify
a satisfactory number of cases, we will then textmine for indicators of the characteristics posited
by previous research.
4.2 Research Methods
The method we propose to use in this research is
based on the process introduced by Greitzer and
Frincke (2010). In this process, data collected is
first refined into observations and then these
observations are clustered into different
indicators. In this section, we first briefly
introduce Greitzer and Frincke’s information
extraction model and then specify the process
and method we will use in this research.
4.2.1 Introduction of the Method

In Greitzer and Frincke’s (2010) approach data
in the form of text based reports is collected.
Data represents direct available information
about activities of individuals such as timecard
© 2015 ADFSL

In this research, our interest has a wider
perspective including but not limited to
psychological indicators of malicious insiders as
Greitzer and Frincke (2011) did. Therefore, we
extend the scope in terms of data, observation
and indicator, but stay with the framework.
We intend to use direct descriptions about extant
malicious insiders from public reports, national
or local media, and previous research as raw
data in our current study. These unstructured
data are processed into structural observations
using information extraction text-mining. In this
process, heuristic methods are employed: we
mine and extract descriptions of malicious
insiders and refined them into observations (a
reflection of certain characteristic or state of
insider), then the next piece of data is processed.
If the observation extracted from data already
exists (i.e., has already been identified), then a
new record of that observation is added to the
others. However, if the item has not yet been
observed then a new observation will be created
and recorded.
A major difference between our method and
Greitzer’s method is that indicators in our
research are not refined and extracted from
observations, but instead they are predefined by
previous research. Therefore, observations are
clustered into indicators specified in Section 3
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using clustering text mining techniques.
However, we note that having predefined
observations will not precluded use from
identifying potential new observations, and we
expect to find some. Modern text mining and
classification techniques are quite powerful and
can yield results not found by human
observation (Fuller, et al., 2011).
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Conclusion
The problem of malicious insider threat is of
concern to practitioners and academic alike, yet
the phenomenon has yet to be significantly
examined beyond the domains of psychology
and criminal science where mainly human
observation is the only means of data collection.
We aim to employ a form of data mining,
namely text mining along with observation
classification to expand and aggregate finding
from multiple historical insider threat cases. In
doing so, we believe we can develop better
indicators for identifying the characteristics of
malicious insiders. However, our work has just
begun. Our next step is to collect cases of
malicious insider threat and all reports and
articles covering each case.
Then, we will
employ our text-mining and classification
techniques identified above to validate the
indicators derived from previous research and
possible identify additional indicators. Finally,
we hope to build a common set of validated
indictors of malicious insiders. We hope this
proposed method will garner discussion and
endorsement from other researchers pursuing
and solution to the insider threat problem.

© 2015 ADFSL
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